Teaching that Speech Matters:
A Framework for Analyzing Speech
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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Morse v. Frederick continues a
pattern of judicial unwillingness to protect student speech. A key flaw in
the Court’s approach is in failing to draw a distinction between
government control over the curriculum (and even student speech in
curricular activities) and student speech outside the school’s curriculum.
Deference to school officials is appropriate in the former, but not in the
latter. Unfortunately, the Court’s approach, as reflected in its last few
decisions concerning student speech, has been uncritical deference to
schools and far too little protection of student speech.
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Courts in recent years have provided little protection for student
speech, least of all when it is involved in curricular activities.1 But the
distinction between “curricular” and “non-curricular” makes little
sense when the speech is a school newspaper, and the censorship has
nothing to do with course instruction. Instead, courts should focus on
whether the government’s choices about speech are in the curricular
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1
In other words, a sensible approach can be drawn between the need for
deference to school officials when regulating speech in curricular activities, but much
less deference when it is student speech outside curricular areas.
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or non-curricular context. Courts should accord schools great
deference in deciding their curriculum, but should be very protective
of student speech in the non-curricular realm.
My proposed approach, unlike the Court’s analysis, gives great
weight to the importance of free speech in schools. All of the values of
freedom of expression exist in educational institutions. Indeed,
protecting freedom of speech advances a core goal of school
education: teaching students about the Constitution and their rights.
At the very least, there is dissonance, if not hypocrisy, in teaching
students that free speech matters when school officials themselves
provide virtually no protection for student speech.
Almost forty years ago, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,2 the Supreme Court articulated a standard
for balancing the free speech rights of students with the educational
mission of schools. The Court held that the government could punish
student speech only if there was a showing that the expression was
actually disruptive of school activities.3 In the four decades since
Tinker, the Court has abandoned this approach, especially as to
curricular activities. The current approach emphasizes great deference
to school officials. I believe that it is time to return to the Tinker
approach, though I think that the Court’s recent decision in Morse v.
Frederick4 certainly indicates that it is unlikely to do so.5
To be clear, in the curricular context, schools can regulate and
evaluate student speech when it relates directly to the curriculum and
education. For example, teachers can punish students for talking out of
turn or disrupting class with speech that is irrelevant to the discussion.
Likewise, teachers, of course, can evaluate student work and give grades
based on its content and quality. But these are not the issues usually
presented in student speech cases and certainly were not the facts of the
leading Supreme Court cases dealing with student speech.

2

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 514.
4
127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
5
Id. at 2621 (holding that “schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to
their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use”).
However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Alito (joined by Justice Kennedy) argued that
Morse reaffirmed and was consistent with Tinker. Id. at 2636-37 (Alito, J., concurring).
But on careful analysis Morse is quite different from Tinker. In Tinker, the Supreme
Court said that the government may punish student speech only if it is actually
disruptive of school activity. There was no suggestion of such disruption in Morse. The
Court’s decision in Morse expressed the need for great deference to school authorities
when they punish student speech. Tinker emphatically rejected such deference.
3
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Part I of this Article describes the Supreme Court’s abandonment of
free speech principles in cases involving the regulation of student
speech. Part II argues that student speech is fundamentally different
from school or government speech. School choices concerning the
actual curriculum are government speech and not vulnerable to First
Amendment challenges. The flaw is that the Court uses the First
Amendment rationale that governs government speech to justify
restricting student speech. There is a critical distinction between the
government as speaker in setting the curriculum and the government as
regulator in punishing student speech. Finally, Part III criticizes the
Court’s approach and argues for much more robust protection for
student speech in public elementary and secondary schools. I urge a
return to the Tinker standard: non-curricular student speech should be
punishable in schools only if it is actually disruptive of school activities.
Ultimately, this Article suggests a framework for analyzing free
speech issues in the school context. Decisions concerning the content
of curriculum are government speech, and so there needs to be great
judicial deference. But school officials should only censor or punish
student speech if there is proof that the expression actually disrupts
school activities.
I.

THE ABANDONMENT OF FREE SPEECH PROTECTION IN SCHOOLS

The key Supreme Court case distinguishing between speech in
curricular as opposed to non-curricular areas was Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier.6 A journalism class, with approval from the
faculty advisor, was going to produce a school newspaper containing
stories about students’ experience with pregnancy and divorce.7 While
the articles discussed student experiences, none referenced specific
student names.8 The principal decided to publish the newspaper
without these articles.9 The principal believed that the article on
pregnancy discussed sexual activity and birth control in a manner
inappropriate for some of the younger students at the school.10
Additionally, the principal was concerned that the anonymous
students in the article on pregnancy might be identified from other

6

484 U.S. 260 (1988).
No students’ names were included in the article on pregnancy, and one name
was mentioned in the article on divorce, although the name had been deleted after the
paper had been forwarded to the principal for review. Id. at 263.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 264.
10
Id. at 263.
7
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aspects of the article.11 Furthermore, the principal believed that the
parents identified in the article about divorce should have had the
opportunity to respond to the article’s contents.12 Three former
student members of the school newspaper sued, contending that
school officials had violated their First Amendment rights.13
The Supreme Court upheld the principal’s decision and rejected the
former students’ First Amendment challenge. At the outset, Justice
White, writing for the Court, quoted Tinker: “Students in the public
schools do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”’14 But he then added, quoting
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,15 the “First Amendment rights
of students in the public schools ‘are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings.”’16 Most significantly,
Justice White then quoted the declaration in Bethel:
“‘The
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.’”17
Justice White concluded the school newspaper was a nonpublic
forum and as a result “school officials were entitled to regulate the
content[ ] of [the school newspaper] in any reasonable manner.”18 In
other words, only rational basis review applied.
The Court
emphasized the ability of schools to control curricular decisions, such
as the content of school newspapers published as part of journalism
classes.19 Justice White wrote:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to
tolerate particular student speech – the question that we
addressed in Tinker – is different from the question whether
the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to
promote particular student speech. The former question
addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal
expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The
11

Id.
Id.
13
Id. at 504.
14
Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
15
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
16
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
17
Id. at 267 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986)).
18
Id. at 270.
19
See id. at 271.
12
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latter question concerns educators’ authority over schoolsponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of
the school.20
The Court stated, in this context, schools have broad authority to
regulate student speech. Justice White wrote:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over . . .
student expression to assure that participants learn whatever
lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate
for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual
speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.21
Justice White concluded that the students’ First Amendment claim
should be denied because the school’s action was reasonable.22 Justice
White emphasized that the judiciary must defer to school officials:
“This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the
education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of
federal judges.”23
The Supreme Court has had only one student speech case since
Hazelwood. In Morse v. Frederick,24 the connection of the student
speech to the curricular decisions of the school was even more
attenuated. Hazelwood involved a newspaper produced as part of a
high school journalism class. In Morse, the speech was outside the
school, though during school hours. When the Olympic torch came
through Juneau, Alaska, a high school released its students from class
to watch.25 As the torchbearer passed by, Joseph Frederick and his
friends, students at the high school, unfurled a banner with the
inscription, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”26 Deborah Morse, the principal,
immediately demanded that the students take down the banner.
Frederick, however, refused.27 Morse, believing that the banner

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 273.
127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
Id. at 2622.
Id.
Id.
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encouraged drug use, confiscated it, and suspended Frederick.28 The
Court held that the First Amendment was not violated when Frederick
was subsequently punished for displaying the banner.29
In an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court said that the
principal could reasonably interpret the banner as encouraging illegal
drug use and that schools have an important interest in stopping such
speech.30 Chief Justice Roberts stressed that this was an official school
activity and that deference to the schools is appropriate in this
context.31 He wrote:
School principals have a difficult job, and a vitally important
one. When Frederick suddenly and unexpectedly unfurled his
banner, Morse had to decide to act–or not act–on the spot. It
was reasonable for her to conclude that the banner promoted
illegal drug use–in violation of established school policy–and
that failing to act would send a powerful message to the
students in her charge, including Frederick, about how serious
the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use.32
In other words, Morse takes the Hazelwood distinction between
curricular and non-curricular and finds that deference to school
officials should extend to all official school activities.
This is not the first case to draw this distinction. In Bethel — which
Chief Justice Roberts expressly invokes and relies upon in Morse —
the Court upheld the punishment of a student for giving a speech
nominating another student for a position in student government,
which was filled with sexual innuendo, at a school assembly.33 The
school suspended the student for a few days and kept him from
speaking at his graduation as scheduled.34 The Court upheld the
punishment and emphasized the need for judicial deference to
educational institutions.35
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Bethel, emphasized
not the need for protecting student speech, but the need for regulating
He began by stressing the importance of schools in
it.36
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 2622-23.
Id. at 2622.
Id.
Id. at 2624.
Id. at 2629.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986).
Id. at 678.
Id. at 683.
See id. at 683.
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“inculcat[ing]” the “habits and manners of civility,”37 and then
declared: “The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and
controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced
against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”38 He concluded:
A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually
explicit monologue . . . . [I]t was perfectly appropriate for the
school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils
that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent
with the “fundamental values” of public school education.39
Most significantly, Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion proclaimed
the need for judicial deference to the authority and expertise of school
officials. He stated: “The determination of what manner of speech in
the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests
with the school board.”40 In fact, Chief Justice Burger concluded his
majority opinion by quoting with approval Justice Black’s dissenting
opinion in Tinker: “‘I wish therefore, . . . to disclaim any purpose . . .
to hold that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents,
and elected school officials to surrender control of the American
public school system to public school students.’”41
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decisions over the last forty years since
Tinker have been clear: there is great deference to school officials in
regulating student speech in official school activities. There is no
requirement that the speech actually disrupt school activities or that there
be any proof that the speech actually causes any harm. Tinker has never
been expressly overruled, but it has been tremendously undermined. As
Mark Yudof stated: “Although these [later decisions] have not
specifically overruled Tinker [sic], Tinker’s [sic] progeny have greatly
altered the holding set forth by the Warren Court.”42 In fact, some lower
courts have even questioned whether Tinker survives at all.43
37
Id. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 228 (1968)).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 685-86.
40
Id. at 683.
41
Id. at 686 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
526 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)).
42
Mark Yudof, Tinker Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and Student Expression, 69
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 365, 366 (1995).
43
Cf. Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737-38 (7th Cir. 1994)
(stating that Supreme Court has “cast some doubt on the extent to which students
retain free speech rights in the school setting”).
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RESTORING THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

II.

There is a distinction to be drawn between speech in curricular as
opposed to non-curricular matters in schools. The key — which the
Supreme Court and often lower courts ignore — is whether it is
school speech as opposed to student speech. Schools need broad
latitude in what they choose to teach students. Any choice as to the
content of the curriculum involves subject matter and even viewpoint
discrimination by the school. There is no basis for a First Amendment
challenge to these choices by school officials. But the ability of
schools to decide what to teach students in classes does not then carry
over to allow the school to regulate student speech.
There has not been a Supreme Court case concerning First
Amendment challenges to curricular decisions by a school. The
closest the Court has come to this issue was in Board of Education,
Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, which considered
the ability of a school library to remove books because they were
deemed “objectionable.”44 In this case, the Court stated that the “First
Amendment rights of students may be directly and sharply implicated
by the removal of books from the shelves of a school library.”45 The
Court explained that the First Amendment protects a right to receive
information, and that the “special characteristics of the school library
make that environment especially appropriate for the recognition of
the First Amendment rights of students.”46 The Court held that
whether removal of books from school libraries violated the First
Amendment depends upon the motivation behind the government’s
actions. The Court explained:
If [the government] intended by their removal decision to deny
respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed,
and if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners’
decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in
violation of the Constitution . . . . On the other hand, . . . an
unconstitutional motivation would not be demonstrated if it
were shown that petitioners had decided to remove the books
at issue because those books were pervasively vulgar.47
The Court remanded the case for a determination of this issue.

44
45
46
47

457 U.S. 853, 856 (1982).
Id. at 866.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 871 (footnote omitted).
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The Court’s decision in Pico makes clear that the government has
“broad discretion in the management of school affairs,” particularly in
selecting curriculum.48 There is no First Amendment basis for objecting
to the government’s choices in its curriculum because the government
expresses a particular viewpoint. Inevitably, curricula will reflect the
views of the government. Curriculum is government speech, and there
is no First Amendment basis for objecting when the government
chooses to speak (unless it violates a specific limitation, such as the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). The Fifth Circuit best
summarized this principle when it declared: “The government
undoubtedly has the authority to control its own message when it
speaks or advocates a position it believes is in the public interest.”49
The Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that the government
may speak and that there is no basis for a First Amendment claim
objecting to the government’s expressive choices.50 For example, in
Rust v. Sullivan, the Court considered whether the government was
engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination when it prohibited
recipients of federal funds from giving abortion-related advice.51 The
Court rejected the First Amendment challenge and declared:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the
problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has not
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.52
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the
Court applied this principle directly to the education context and held
for the government on the following basis: “When the University
determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University
speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the
content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it
enlists private entities to convey its own message.”53
48

Id. at 863-64.
Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 612 (5th Cir. 2005).
50
See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (stating that
generic advertising funded by targeted assessment on beef producers was “government
speech,” not susceptible to First Amendment compelled-subsidy challenge).
51
500 U.S. 173, 177 (1991).
52
Id. at 193.
53
515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
49
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In other cases as well, the Court has been emphatic that when the
government is speaking as to matters of curriculum there is absolutely
no basis for a First Amendment challenge. For instance, in Arkansas
Education Television Communication v. Forbes, the Court upheld the
ability of a government-owned television station to limit a public
debate to candidates from major parties.54 The Court explained:
Much like a university selecting a commencement speaker, a
public institution selecting speakers for a lecture series, or a
public school prescribing its curriculum, a broadcaster by its
nature will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints instead
of others. Were the judiciary to require, and so to define and
approve, pre-established criteria for access, it would risk
implicating the courts in judgments that should be left to the
exercise of . . . discretion.55
The error in the Court’s student speech decisions is in failing to
draw a distinction between the speech of the government institution
and the speech of the students. From this perspective, Morse and for
that matter Tinker, are clearly not government speech. Hazelwood,
though, is a harder case because it involves a newspaper published by
the school, though written by the students. In the government speech
cases described in Forbes,56 Rust,57 and Rosenberger,58 the government
is not regulating the speech of those outside the government — it is
just choosing the message that it wants to adopt. But in the student
newspaper context, like Hazelwood, it is very much the government
regulating the speech of others.
Thus, the First Amendment status of student speech in student
newspapers
cannot be resolved by the distinction between
government and private speech or even by labeling the newspaper a
non-public forum (as the Court did in Hazelwood).
It is
fundamentally different from traditional non-public forums in that it is

54

523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998).
Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
56
Id. at 669 (concerning speech and programming content of state-owned public
television station).
57
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177 (concerning Department of Health and
Human Services regulations which limit ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in
abortion-related activities).
58
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822-23 (relating to state university’s decision to fund
printing costs of certain student publications).
55
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a place created for speech purposes. A newspaper, unlike say a
military base59 or an airport,60 exists for speech purposes.
The treatment of student newspapers must depend on the basis for
the government regulation. If it is a choice related to the curricular
mission of student newspapers, there must be great deference to the
government. For example, if the journalism teacher chooses not to
publish an article because of a quality judgment about it or its writing,
judicial deference is necessary. But that, of course, was not what
occurred in Hazelwood. In that case, the journalism teacher approved
the articles. Once the paper was at the printer, the principal ordered
that articles be omitted because he thought that high school students
should not read about teenage pregnancy or the effects of divorce. This
had nothing to do with curricular decisions. Arguably, it is a decision
about education, and from that perspective it is quite troubling.
Schools have long claimed that they have an important mission of
inculcating in students a knowledge of, and respect for, the principles
of the Constitution. For example, in Ambach v. Norwich, the Court
upheld the ability of schools to exclude non-citizens from holding
teaching positions.61 The Court said that teachers are integral to selfgovernment because they are responsible for inculcating democratic
values in youth.62 The Court explained that “a teacher has an
opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government,
the political process, and a citizen’s social responsibilities. This
influence is crucial to the continued good health of a democracy.”63
From this perspective Hazelwood, and also cases like Bethel and
Morse, are troubling because they do not recognize the important role of
the First Amendment in the context of schools. When schools censor
or punish student speech, it is antithetical to teaching the importance of
speech. All of the traditional values of protecting speech, apply just as
much in schools as in any other context. This, of course, is not to say
that all student speech is protected under all circumstances. But nor is
all speech protected under all circumstances outside of the school
context. Affording deference to school officials in regulating speech
related to curricular decisions is important because it gives schools great
latitude to control the education of students. But speech outside of
59
See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that military bases are
non-public forums).
60
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)
(holding that airports are non-public forums).
61
441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979).
62
Id. at 79.
63
Id.
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curricular decisions, as in Tinker, Bethel, Hazelwood, and Morse,
warrants far less deference to school officials.
The response to this is that all decisions by school officials concern
the education of students and thus courts should defer to school
regulation of student speech. But this argument leaves no role for
freedom of speech in schools. It also assumes that just because a
principal asserts that something is done for educational reasons,
courts must step aside and accept that conclusion. There is a clear
difference between the government choosing the curriculum it will
teach and the government deciding that it does not like a certain
message, such as a banner that the principal interprets as encouraging
illegal drug use. The latter raises the traditional First Amendment
concern of the government controlling the content of messages by
speakers. This poses an inherently different constitutional question
than when the government is choosing what it wants to have taught in
a particular part of the curriculum.
III. THE STANDARD FOR REGULATING STUDENT SPEECH
Almost forty years ago, in Tinker, the Supreme Court articulated a
standard for when schools can punish student speech. Tinker is a
desirable standard because it preserves the ability of schools to punish
speech that disrupts the educational process while protecting student
expression that is not disruptive. Unfortunately, the Court has since
abandoned Tinker, as most recently and strongly evidenced in Morse.
In Tinker, three high school students chose to wear armbands to
protest the Vietnam War.64 The school suspended them for doing so.65
The Supreme Court, in a 7–2 decision, ruled in favor of the students’
free speech rights and against the school’s.
Justice Fortas wrote the opinion for the majority and expressed
three important themes concerning students’ rights that constitute the
speech protective model. First, students retain constitutional rights
within schools.66 After his famous declaration that students do not
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
“This has been the
the schoolhouse gate,”67 Fortas states:
unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 [sic] years.”68 After
a long string of citations to many prior Supreme Court rulings, Justice
64
65
66
67
68

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
Id.
See id. at 506.
Id.
Id.

2009]

Teaching that Speech Matters

837

Fortas quotes Justice Robert Jackson’s eloquent opinion from West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette69:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States,
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures—Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the
Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.70
Later in his majority opinion, Justice Fortas returns to this theme and
powerfully proclaims the free speech rights of students. Fortas declares:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority
over their students. Students in school as well as out of school
are “persons” under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our
system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients
of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may
not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are
officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.71
Like Justice Jackson in Barnette, Justice Fortas stressed that freedom of
speech is especially important in schools. He quoted an earlier opinion
from Justice Brennan declaring: “The vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools. The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”72
Justice Fortas concluded his opinion by returning to this theme and
again forcefully expressed the need to protect student speech:

69

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 637).
71
Id. at 511.
72
Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
70
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Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given
only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in
fact. Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right
could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government
has provided as a safe haven for crackpots. The Constitution
says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to
free speech. This provision means what it says.73
The expression of support for student speech in Tinker is much
deeper than its single, most famous sentence. A core theme is that the
First Amendment protects student speech, and safeguarding such
expression advances the First Amendment’s central purposes. Justice
Fortas regards safeguarding speech as a crucial part of educating
students about the Constitution, rather than as a practice in tension
with the schools’ mission.
The second theme expressed throughout the opinion is schools may
punish student speech only upon proof that the speech would
“substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon
the rights of other students.”74 Justice Fortas explained:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able
to show that its action [is] . . . something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is
no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden
conduct would “materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school,” the prohibition cannot be sustained.75
At the end of the majority opinion, Justice Fortas returned to this
theme and stated government regulation of student speech is
unconstitutional unless it can be “justified by a showing that the
students’ activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work
and discipline of the school.”76 Mere fear of disruption is not enough.
The burden is on the school to prove the need for restricting student
speech, and the standard is a stringent one — there must be proof that
the speech would “materially and substantially” disrupt the school.77
73
74
75
76
77

Id. at 513.
Id. at 509.
Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
Id. at 513.
Id.
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The final theme expressed in Tinker is the need for careful judicial
review to ensure the school has met this heavy burden. Repeatedly
throughout the opinion, Justice Fortas emphasized the lack of
evidence to support punishing the speech. Early in the opinion, he
wrote: “As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the
circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or
potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it.”78 Later he
wrote:
“There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’
interference, actual or nascent, with the schools’ work or of collision
with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”79
He noted only a few of the students in a school system of 18,000 wore
the armbands, and “[t]here [was] no indication that the work of the
schools or any class was disrupted.”80
In a crucial part of the opinion, Justice Fortas stated there must have
been more than “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”81 He
stated the district court made no finding that the speech would
interfere with the schools’ activities and “our independent
examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands
would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge
upon the rights of other students.”82
Justice Fortas concluded the majority opinion by observing: “[T]he
record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have
led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on
the school premises in fact occurred.”83 Thus, it is not for a court to
accept the claims of school officials about the need to stop the speech.
The court must independently review the facts and determine whether
there is sufficient evidence of significant disruptive effect to justify
punishing expression.
No subsequent Supreme Court decision has followed these
principles. Certainly, Morse, the most recent free speech case, did not
use this approach. There was no evidence of any disruption of school
activities as a result of Frederick holding up the banner saying,
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” Chief Justice Roberts did not assert that
78
79
80
81
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83
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Id. at 509.
Id.
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Frederick’s banner would have the slightest effect in encouraging drug
use. He could not do so. It is questionable whether students
understood the banner as encouraging drug use, and even if they did,
it is doubtful any would be more likely to use drugs because of it.
Justice Stevens expressed this well:
This is a nonsense message, not advocacy. The Court’s feeble
effort to divine its hidden meaning is strong evidence of
that. . . . Admittedly, some high school students (including
those who use drugs) are dumb. Most students, however, do
not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate, and most
students know dumb advocacy when they see it. The notion
that the message on this banner would actually persuade either
the average student or even the dumbest one to change his or
her behavior is most implausible.84
The Court in Morse adopted an approach of great deference to school
officials that echoed Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker, not the approach
followed by the seven-Justice majority. Justice Black disputed the
constitutional protection for students’ speech. In Tinker, he wrote: “I
deny, therefore, that it has been the ‘unmistakable holding of this Court
for almost 50 [sic] years’ that ‘students’ and ‘teachers’ take with them
into the ‘schoolhouse gate’ constitutional rights to ‘freedom of speech or
expression.’”85 Later in his dissenting opinion, Justice Black explicitly
declared his view that there should be almost complete deference to the
schools: “Here the Court should accord [educational institutions]
the . . . right to determine for themselves to what extent free expression
should be allowed in its schools.”86
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Morse similarly expresses
the need for great deference to school principals.87 Although he does
not go as far as Justice Thomas, who urged the express overruling of
Tinker,88 in practical reality there is not much that remains of Tinker
under the Roberts approach of deference to schools.
CONCLUSION
Because Tinker has not been expressly overruled, it can be revived as
part of the framework for analyzing speech issues in public schools. In
84
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this essay, I have argued that a distinction can be drawn between
curricular decisions, where there needs to be great deference to schools,
and regulation of student speech outside the curricular area. The latter
should be governed by the Tinker standard — student speech should be
punishable only if it is actually disruptive of school activities.
Of course, as with any distinction, there will be hard cases in
deciding what is curricular as opposed to non-curricular. But focusing
on whether the government is the speaker and on the underlying
values of the First Amendment often should be helpful in resolving the
hard cases. Also, there will need to be determinations of whether
student speech is actually disruptive of school activities. But these are
the right questions to focus on and will provide far more protection
for First Amendment values than the Court’s approach in cases like
Bethel, Hazelwood, and Morse.

